Software supply chain attacks are becoming increasingly prevalent and devastating. For example, Gartner predicts that 45% of all businesses will experience a breach by 2025. In addition, Cybersecurity Ventures underscores the gravity of this threat, projecting a staggering $138 billion in annual damages by 2031. Altogether, these forecasts highlight the urgent need for organizations to prioritize software supply chain security and implement robust measures to protect sensitive data, operations, and reputations.
Because modern pipelines depend heavily on external components, the rise of third-party libraries, faster software development cycles, complex supply chains, lack of visibility, new attack techniques, SaaS adoption, and limited resources are all driving the surge in software supply chain attacks. Therefore, organizations must adopt a comprehensive and active approach to address these challenges and protect their software supply chains.
What is a Software Supply Chain Attack?
ENISA defines a Software Supply Chain Attack as “a compromise of a particular asset, e.g. a software provider’s infrastructure and commercial software, to indirectly damage a certain target or targets, e.g. the software provider’s clients.” In other words, a Software Supply Chain Attack is a malicious activity that targets the software supply chain, aiming to compromise and insert vulnerabilities or malware into the development and distribution process. As a result, this type of attack exploits the interconnected and often complicated network of processes, tools, and entities involved in building and delivering software.
Key components and concepts related to a Software Supply Chain Attack
Cyber threat intelligence and infosec literature often break down software supply chain attacks into distinct categories for better analysis and defense. Accordingly, this section introduces the five key concepts defined by the MITRE Attack Pattern Catalog. This catalog structures supply chain attack patterns to facilitate analysis using various sources, including adversarial threats gathered by NIST.
Attack Act: The What
The attack act is the specific action that delivers a malicious payload or intention to a system. As a result, it produces direct harm.
- Example 1: Malware inserted into system software during the build process.
- Example 2: System requirements or design documents maliciously altered.
Attack Vector: The How
The attack vector is the method adversaries use to exploit vulnerabilities or process weaknesses. Consequently, it shows how attackers access and abuse the attack surface.
- Example 1: An attacker modifies source code in a compromised repository.
- Example 2: An attacker gains unauthorized access to internal technical documentation.
Explore further in our Attack Vector Glossary for additional insights.
Attack Origin: The Who
The origin identifies the source of the attack. Therefore, it clarifies the attacker’s role, status, or relationship to the system.
- Example 1: An insider with privileged access to build servers modifies a script.
- Example 2: An external threat actor uploads a trojanized package to a public registry.
Attack Goal: The Why
The goal explains the reason behind the attack. Above all, it highlights what adversaries want to achieve.
- Disruption: halting services or builds.
- Corruption: reducing trust by changing artifacts or source code.
- Disclosure: leaking sensitive secrets or intellectual property.
Attack Impact: The Consequences
Finally, the impact describes the outcomes of an attack, showing the consequences for software providers and clients.
- Example 1: Any project that uses a bad program will become corrupted later on.
- Example 2: People install bad software into their work systems without knowing it.
Most common Software Supply Chain Attacks
Numerous types of software supply chain attacks exist, and organizations must be aware of the various threat vectors at each stage of the lifecycle. Based on the SLSA framework, the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), these threats can be grouped into four categories: source, build, package, and dependency risks.
Software Supply Chain Attacks in the Source Stage
- Submit bad code → see how Flask request.get misuse or insecure deserialization flaws create direct attack surfaces.
- Compromise source repo
- Build from a modified source
- Write insecure code
- Tampering critical files → as explained in chmod 777 backdoor analysis.
Software Supply Chain Attacks in the Build Stage
In the Build Stage, developers compile and integrate code into a working version. Because this phase is so critical, risks include skipping security checks in the CI/CD pipeline, changing code after version control, or compromising the build process. Consequently, malicious code can sneak into artifacts unnoticed.
- Bypass CI/CD → linked to GitHub prebuild malware.
- Modify code after source control
- Compromise build process → mitigated with DevSecOps early warning detection.
- Compromise artifact repository
Software Supply Chain Attacks in the Package Stage
The Package Stage is when we put all the code together to make a final product. This part is risky because someone might use bad packages or change the online places where we get them. Attackers can even upload harmful versions of popular packages to these websites.
- Use compromised package → covered in malware scanner evaluations.
- Compromise package registry
- Upload modified package → analyzed in Namso-gen fake generator malware.
Software Supply Chain Attacks in the Dependency Stage
In the Dependency Stage, we add third-party libraries and packages to our software. This stage is risky because any problems in those parts can easily and quietly spread to the rest of the project.
- Use Compromised Dependency → explained with DoS risks in obfuscated dependencies.
- Outdated or Vulnerable Dependencies
- Transitive Dependency Risks
- Malicious Package Registries → mitigated with DevOps security tools and third-party risk management.
Common Supply Chain Risks at Each Stage of the SDLC
| Stage | Typical Threats | Example |
|---|---|---|
| Source |
• Submitting malicious or insecure code • Tampering with critical files • Compromising the source repository |
XcodeGhost (2015): malicious code injected into Apple’s Xcode compiler, spreading across iOS apps. |
| Build |
• Bypassing CI/CD security checks • Modifying code after source control • Compromising artifact repositories |
SolarWinds Orion (2020): attackers infiltrated the build pipeline, inserting a backdoor into signed software updates. |
| Package |
• Uploading modified packages • Poisoning package registries • Distributing compromised artifacts |
EventStream NPM (2018): attacker inserted a backdoor into a popular NPM package downloaded thousands of times. |
| Dependency |
• Using outdated or vulnerable dependencies • Exploiting transitive dependencies • Publishing malicious lookalike packages |
XZ Utils Backdoor (2024): a trojanized compression library nearly shipped downstream into Linux distributions. |
Common Software Supply Chain Attack Techniques
According to the CISA and NIST report, software supply chain attacks often fall into three main categories.
However, recent incidents show additional vectors that developers must understand.
Below we expand on the most relevant techniques with practical examples.
Hijacking Updates
Attackers compromise legitimate update mechanisms to distribute malware.
For example, the NotPetya attack in 2017 abused the Ukrainian M.E.Doc tax software update server, delivering
destructive wiper malware disguised as a patch. To defend against this risk, teams should apply threat detection and response for DevOps practices that flag anomalous behavior in update flows.
Undermining Code Signing
This technique involves abusing or stealing valid signing certificates to make malicious code appear legitimate.
A notable case was the CCleaner compromise in 2017, where attackers distributed trojanized software signed with valid certificates.
Consequently, organizations need unified integrity controls such as those described in cybersecurity platform strategies
Compromising Open-Source Code
Adversaries insert backdoors into popular open-source packages, later pulled into thousands of projects.
The EventStream NPM incident and the XZ Utils backdoor (2024) illustrate how critical this vector has become.
Developers should review resources like NPM Security FAQs and typosquatted package incidents to learn how to avoid poisoned dependencies.
Dependency Confusion
First described by Alex Birsan in 2021, this attack exploits naming collisions between internal and public package registries, tricking build systems into pulling malicious versions instead of trusted internal packages.
Typosquatting and Malicious Packages
Attackers publish malicious packages with names similar to popular libraries (e.g., “reqeusts” instead of “requests”).
Developers accidentally install these, introducing malware into their projects.
A real example is analyzed in Namso-gen malware and in our list of open-source malware scanners.
Build Pipeline Tampering
As seen in the SolarWinds Orion compromise, attackers can infiltrate build servers to inject malicious code during compilation.
This makes the entire signed artifact chain untrustworthy. Techniques for prevention include monitoring CI/CD integrity with early warning detection and analyzing
GitHub prebuild malware campaigns.
How a Software Supply Chain Attack Looks Like: The SolarWinds Case
Above all, the SolarWinds Orion attack is the most known example of a software supply chain breach. It shows how attackers can move step by step in the build process and, as a result, spread harmful code to thousands of users.
First, attackers got into SolarWinds’ build servers.
After that, they quietly added malicious code into Orion updates.
Because these updates were signed and shipped as trusted software, many companies installed them without knowing the risk.
All in all, more than 18,000 organizations were affected, and attackers gained access to very sensitive systems.
From a developer’s view, this attack gives three simple lessons:
- Perimeter defenses are not enough: the attackers changed the build pipeline itself.
- Continuous checks are critical: secure build attestations, integrity checks, and anomaly detection help block tampering.
- One poisoned build can go global: a single pipeline compromise can create a worldwide security crisis.
Xygeni: The Ultimate All-in-One AppSec Platform
Because software supply chain attacks can hit at every step of the SDLC,
the all-in-one AppSec platform, Xygeni, protects source, build, package, and dependency stages. It gives developers and security teams one place to prevent, detect, and fix risks in a simple way. As a result, you no longer need to juggle multiple tools, Xygeni covers the full lifecycle.
Source Stage Protection
At the source stage, risks include unsafe commits, poisoned repositories, or altered files. Xygeni scans code in real time with deep SAST and secrets detection.
It also blocks harmful commits through CI/CD guardrails.
This way, issues are stopped before they ever leave the repository.
Build Stage Protection
During the build stage, attackers may try to bypass pipelines or alter artifacts.
Xygeni secures the build process with SLSA-compliant checks, integrity validation, and keyless signatures. It also watches for unusual behavior inside CI/CD jobs. As a result, tampered builds are flagged right away and blocked before release.
Package Stage Protection
In the package stage, compromised registries or modified libraries often introduce malware. Xygeni’s malware detection and license scanning review every artifact, while AutoFix suggests safe upgrade paths with its Remediation Risk analysis. Only verified and compliant packages move forward in the pipeline.
Dependency Stage Protection
Third-party code is the biggest attack surface. Xygeni’s Software Composition Analysis (SCA) does more than list CVEs, it checks if risky code can actually be exploited. It also flags hidden malware and risky transitive dependencies. Above all, this ensures developers ship only safe dependencies.
Secrets and Infrastructure Security
Beyond code and packages, attacks often exploit leaked secrets or weak infrastructure. Xygeni scans for exposed keys, tokens, and credentials in code, configs, and Docker layers. It can also validate and auto-revoke leaked secrets with AutoFix remediation. At the same time, IaC scanning prevents misconfigurations that attackers could later abuse.
Smarter Detection and Fixes
Most tools stop at alerts. Xygeni goes further. Its AutoFix engine creates secure patches, pull requests, or step-by-step guidance depending on the issue. Its Remediation Risk view also shows which patch version is safest, so teams fix problems without adding new ones.
One Unified Platform
Because Xygeni combines SAST, SCA, malware detection, secrets management, IaC scanning, anomaly detection, and secure build controls in one AppSec platform,
it gives full coverage across the SDLC. Both developers and security teams gain one source of truth with clear visibility, practical fixes, and strong protection against supply chain attacks.
All things considered, Xygeni, the ultimate all-in-one AppSec platform, helps teams build fast and stay secure. By protecting source, build, package, and dependency stages, and by adding automated fixes at every step, it makes sure software supply chain attacks are stopped before they reach production.
